Finding explicit extractors is an important derandomization goal that has received a lot of attention in the past decade. Previous research has focused on two approaches, one related to hashing and the other to pseudorandom generators. A third view, regarding extractors as good error correcting codes, was noticed before. Yet, researchers had failed to build extractors directly from a good code without using other tools from pseudorandomness. We succeed in constructing an extractor directly from a Reed-Muller code. To do this, we develop a novel proof technique.
Introduction

History and background.
Sipser (2) and Santha (3) were the first to realize that extractor-like structures can be used to save on randomness. Sipser and Santha showed the existence of such objects, and left open the problem of explicitly constructing them. True extractors were first defined in (4):
n × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} m is an -extractor for a class of distributions X over {0, 1}
n , if for every distribution X ∈ X the distribution E(X, U t ) is within statistical distance from U m .
3 E is called strong if U t • E(X, U t ) is within of uniform (here • denotes concatenation and U t refers to the same uniform distribution, i.e., not two independent copies). E is explicit if E(x, y) can be computed in time polynomial in the input length n + t. E is a (k, )-extractor if E is an extractor for all distributions with min-entropy k. 4 Thus, extractors extract the entropy from a defective random source X ∈ X using a small number t of additional truly random bits. The goal is to construct extractors for any min-entropy k with t as small as possible and m, the number of output bits, as large as possible.
Building on earlier work of Zuckerman (5; 6), Nisan and Zuckerman (4) built an extractor with t = O(log 2 n) when the entropy of the source k was high, k = Ω(n). Srinivasan and Zuckerman (7) extended this solution to the case k = n 1/2+ and Ta-Shma (8) further extended it to any entropy k. Also, TaShma was the first to extract all the entropy from the source. Zuckerman (9) showed a construction with t = O(log n) working for high entropies k = Ω(n). All of this work used hashing and k-wise independence in various forms.
Departing from previous techniques, Trevisan (10) showed a connection between pseudorandom generators for small circuits and extractors. Trevisan used the Nisan-Wigderson pseudorandom generator (11) to construct a simple and elegant extractor that achieves t = O(log n) when k = n Ω(1) ( and t = O(log
any k O(
any k O(log n) k/ log n (14)
k ≥ √ nm log 2 n log n + O(log(log * m)) m This paper k ≥ n 1/c m log n + O(c 2 log m) m This paper Ω(n) log n + O(log log n) Ω(k) This paper any k log n + Θ(1) k + t − Θ(1) Optimal. (16) Table 1 Milestones in building explicit extractors. The error is a constant.
Thus, in the current state of the art, there are two techniques that are used in various forms and combinations and different degrees of complexity. Even after all that work, all known constructions use t ≥ 2 log n (and often much more) while the lower bound is only t = log n + O(1). This progress is summarized in Table 1 .1 for the case of constant error .
The significance of the extractor degree.
Besides their straightforward applications to simulating randomized algorithms using weak sources, extractors have had applications to many areas in derandomization that are seemingly unrelated to weak sources. These include constructing expanders that beat the second eigenvalue method (17) , superconcentrators and non-blocking networks (17) , sorting and selecting in rounds (17) , pseudorandom generators for space-bounded computation (4), unapproximability of Clique (6) and certain Σ P 2 minimization problems (18) , time versus space complexities (2) , leader election (9; 19) , another proof that BPP ⊆ PH (20) , random sampling using few random bits (9) , and errorcorrecting codes with strong list decoding properties (21) . Håstad (22) uses non-explicit dispersers 5 in his result that Clique is unapproximable to within n 1−α for any α > 0. The use of non-explicit dispersers make the result depend on the assumption that NP = ZPP; a derandomized version would assume that NP = P.
In many of these applications, extractors are viewed as highly unbalanced strong expanders. In this view an extractor is a bipartite graph G = (V, W, E) with V = {0, 1} n , W = {0, 1} m , and an edge (x, z) exists iff there is some y ∈ {0, 1} t such that E(x, y) = z. Thus, the degree of each vertex of V is T = 2 t , and the extractor hashes the input x ∈ V to a random neighbor among its T neighbors in W .
Often this degree T is of more interest than t = log T . For example, in the samplers of (9) the degree is the number of samples; in the simulation of BPP using weak sources (6) the degree is the number of calls to the BPP algorithm; in the extractor codes of (21) T is the length of the code; and in the unapproximability of Clique, the size of the graph is closely related to T .
As stated before, all previous constructions have degree T which is at least poly(n) = poly(log |V |) while the lower bound (that matches non-explicit constructions) is only T = Ω(n) = Ω(log |V |). Our construction breaks the polynomial degree bound and is the first explicit construction with degree close to linear.
Our construction was used by Mossel and Umans (1) to show that it is AMhard to approximate VC dimension to within a large factor. In fact, Mossel and Umans only need that for all δ > 0 there are explicit dispersers with degree n 1+δ for sources with min-entropy n δ , and we supply an even smaller degree.
Recently, Guruswami (23) used our construction to explicitly build error correcting codes with 1 − list-decoding and close to Ω( ) rate. The list decoding algorithm returns sub-exponentially many possible solutions. Guruswami also showed ((23), Corollary 3) that extractors with small degree that work for low entropies, lead to close to optimal list-decodable error correcting codes.
Another inapproximibailty result that requires dispersers of very low degree is Håstad's result (22) that Clique cannot be approximated to within n 1−α for any constant α > 0, assuming NP = ZPP. The unproven assumption could be relaxed to NP = P if for any positive constant γ the following disperser could be efficiently constructed. For sources with min-entropy k = γn, the output length should be linear in k (and hence n), and the degree should be O(n/ log(1 − ) −1 ). Note that as the error approaches 1, the degree becomes less than n. This dependence on is known non-explicitly and matches lower bounds. Very recently such a disperser was announced (24).
Our construction.
Our construction uses error-correcting codes. Codes are known to be related to extractors. Trevisan's extractor can be viewed as first encoding the weak source input x ∈ {0, 1} n with any good binary error correcting code (good here means minimum distance close to half) and then using the truly random string y to select bits from the encoded string using designs. A natural question is whether one can use a specific good code to allow y to be used in a more efficient way. Our extractor construction is the first to do this.
Our good code is a Reed-Muller code concatenated with a good binary code. Specifically, we view the input x from the weak source as defining a degree h multivariate polynomial f x : F D → F over some large field F (h is about n 1/D , the size of F is slightly larger than h). We further choose a good binary error correcting code C to encode field elements. Our code maps x to the sequence of values C(f x (a)), where a goes over all the elements of F D .
We now use the truly random string y to choose output bits from the encoding of x. We think of the random string y as indexing an element a ∈ F D and a random position j of the binary code. The ith output bit of the extractor, E(x; y) i , is
i.e., the jth bit of C(f x (a+(i, 0, . . . , 0))). Thus, the construction can be viewed as using a Reed-Muller concatenated with a good binary code for encoding, and selecting the code evaluation on m consecutive points a + (1, 0, . . . , 0), a + (2, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , a + (m, 0, . . . , 0) for the output.
Notice the simple way in which we use the random string y to select the output bits. Indeed, this gives an extractor using only t = log n + O(log m ) truly random bits. For simplicity we will focus on the bivariate case, though the multivariate case works as well, and gives different parameters. We prove:
Theorem 2 For every m = m(n), k = k(n) and = (n) ≤ 1/2 such that 3m √ n log(n/ ) ≤ k ≤ n, there exists an explicit family of (k, ) strong extractors E n : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} m with t = log n + O(log m) + O(log 1 ).
Furthermore, we can reduce the O(log m) term above to O(log(log * m)). To do that we notice that our construction (and also Trevisan's) can be viewed as an efficient reduction from the problem of constructing extractors for general sources, to the problem of constructing extractors for almost block sources (defined in §3.1). We then show an efficient construction for almost block sources. We get:
Theorem 3 For every m = m(n), k = k(n) and = (n) such that 3m √ n log(n/ ) ≤ k ≤ n and m ≥ Ω(log 2 ( 1 )), there exists an explicit family of (k, ) strong ex-
Notice that while we dramatically improve the random bit complexity, both constructions work only for entropies k = n 1/2+γ and the number of output bits is only k δ for some δ < γ. We can make the construction work for smaller entropies by using multivariate polynomials instead of bivariate polynomials, but then we pay in the number of the output bits and the error. Namely, we prove:
Theorem 4 For every constant D and m = m(n) ≤ (n/ log n) 1/D , there exists an explicit family of (k, ) strong extractors
.
We can also extract more output bits in the case where the entropy is large, namely, k = Ω(n). Formally,
Theorem 5
For any constant δ > 0, there exists a constant γ and an explicit family of (δn, 1/ log n) strong extractors E : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} m with t = log n + O(log log n) and m = γn.
The ideas of this paper were generalized in (25) and later on in (26) to give the best known explicit extractors and pseudo-random generators. We note, however, that both (25) and (26) use O(log n) truly random bits, rather than (1 + o(1)) log(n) truly random bits as in our construction.
Our proof technique.
At the highest level our proof plan resembles Trevisan's. That is, we assume that the distribution E(X, U t ) is not close to uniform. Also, w.l.o.g., we assume the distribution X is uniformly distributed on its support (see Fact 6) . It is convenient to overload notation and use X to denote both the distribution and its support. Yao's lemma gives us a next element predictor that on average can learn the value f x (a 1 +i, a 2 ) from the values f x (a 1 +1, a 2 ), . . . , f x (a 1 +i−1, a 2 ), where f x : F 2 → F is the bivariate polynomial representing x. We then use the predictor to give a small description of the elements in X. We conclude that if E(X, U t ) is not close to uniform, then X is small. Equivalently, the contra-positive is that if the set X is large (so the distribution X has large min-entropy), then E(X, U t ) is close to uniform.
We now describe how we use the predictor to give a small description of the elements in X. We play a mental game. We pick a random line L and assume someone gives us the correct values of f x on m − 1 consecutive parallel leftshifts of L, i.e., L − (1, 0) through L − (m − 1, 0). In other words, each point on L is preceded by m − 1 points for which we already know the correct value of f x . Hence we can use the predictor to predict that point, with some moderately good success probability. Overall, the predictor is correct for many points on L.
We now wish to find the value of f x on the line L. Note that f x restricted to L is a low-degree polynomial, i.e., a codeword of a Reed-Solomon code. Assume for the moment that our predictor is correct on, say, 90% of the points on L. Then we could find the unique low-degree polynomial which agrees with the predicted values 90% of the time. This is the usual decoding of Reed-Solomon codes.
Proceeding in the same way, we then learn 0) , etc., until we learn enough lines to reconstruct f x itself. This is illustrated in Figure 1 .4.
We have the following stages: (1) We query the value of f x on h − 1 parallel lines. Notice that f x restricted to a line is a univariate degree h polynomial, so this amounts to (m − 1)h point queries. (2) For each point on the next parallel line, we use the next element predictor to predict the value of f x on it. (3) We find the unique polynomial that has large agreement with our prediction. (4) We keep learning consecutive lines until we recover f x , hence also x itself. In reality, our predictor is only guaranteed to be correct with probability smaller than half. Hence unique decoding is impossible, and we will have to use "list-decoding" of Reed-Solomon codes to narrow our choices. We will then have to make additional "line queries" to determine the correct value of f x restricted to the lines.
Playing this mental game, we can prove that for every set X for which E(X, U t ) is not close to uniform, there exists a set of about mh queries (and recall that h is about √ n and m is the number of output bits) such that almost every x ∈ X can be reconstructed given the answers to these queries. Note that h 2 queries can always reconstruct X; our gain is that we can reconstruct the elements of X using only mh instead of h 2 queries. This shows that |X| ≤ |F| mh , or equivalently that the distribution X has min-entropy at most mh log q. We conclude that if the distribution X has larger min-entropy, than the distribution E(X, U ) is close to uniform.
The technique was inspired by work done on list decoding of Reed-Muller codes, and its application to hardness amplification in (27) . Aside from applying an error-correcting technique to a different information theoretic setting, our proof technique has additional ideas. For example, we obtain our savings by learning a line using previously learned lines, and this whole notion of recycling queries makes sense only in our setting and does not appear in previous constructions.
Our construction is the first purely algebraic extractor construction, and the first to rely solely on error-correcting codes. We believe this is a clean and elegant way of constructing extractors.
Organization of the paper
In §2 we give formal definitions, and state the results we use from coding theory. In §3 we give a top-down overview of the construction and the proof. The proof is given in two parts: first (in §3.2) , a reduction to almost block sources (that are defined in §3.1), then an extractor for such sources (stated in §3.3). In §3.4 we put everything together to derive Theorems 2 and 3. In §3.5 we explain how to get more output bits and derive Theorem 5. In the later sections we fill the theorems stated in the top-down overview. In §4 we show the reduction to almost block sources and in §5 we present explicit extractors for almost block sources. Finally, in §6 we show the higher dimensional version of our construction and prove Theorem 4.
Preliminaries
Notation. Throughout, F = F q denotes a field of prime size q. As usual, [n] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. For S ⊆ F and a ∈ F, S + a denotes the set {s + a : s ∈ S}. For two sets
All logarithms are to the base 2. We will assume, when needed, that various quantities are integers. It is not hard to check that this has only a negligible effect on our analysis.
We will constantly be discussing probability distributions, the distances between them, and the randomness hidden in them. In this subsection we give the basic definitions used to allow such a discussion.
A probability distribution X over a (finite) space Λ simply assigns to each a ∈ Λ a positive real X(a) > 0, with the property that a∈Λ X(a) = 1. For a subset S ⊆ Λ we denote X(S) = a∈S X(a). A distribution is flat if it is uniformly distributed over its support. The uniform distribution U on Λ is defined as U (a) = 1/|Λ| for all a ∈ Λ. U k denotes the uniform distribution over {0, 1} k .
We identify a random variable with the probability distribution it induces. Thus, if X is a random variable, then x ∈ X denotes picking an element x according to the distribution the random variable X induces. We denote random variables and distributions by capital letters, and use small letters a, x, z... to denote elements in the probability space.
The statistical distance (or variation distance) between two distributions D 1 and D 2 on the same space S is max
We say two distributions are -close if their statistical distance is at most . The min-entropy of a distribution D on a probability space S is min s∈S {− log 2 D(s)}.
Extractors. We gave the definition of an extractor in §1.1. As we said there,
m is a (k, ) extractor iff it is an extractor for all distributions with k min-entropy. It is well known that every distribution with k min-entropy, for an integer k, can be expressed as a convex combination of flat distributions with k min-entropy. In particular,
Fact 6 E is a (k, ) extractor iff E is an extractor against all flat sources with k min-entropy.
This means that to show that E : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} m is a (k, ) extractor, it suffices to concentrate on flat distributions X that are uniformly distributed over some large set X of cardinality at least 2 k . For each such X we need to show that E(X, U t ) is -close to uniform.
Polynomials. We will use the following lemma due to Sudan.
Binary Codes.
Definition 8 A binary code has combinatorial list decoding property α if every Hamming ball of relative radius
We will use codes from the following code construction due to (29) . 3 Top-down overview
Almost Block Sources
Block sources were defined and studied in many early papers, most notably (32; 33; 4; 7). We extend this definition to a β-almost block source:
The following lemma shows that a β-almost block source with b blocks is bβ close to a block source. Notice, that the penalty bβ depends linearly on the number of blocks, a dependance that is sometimes too costly for us.
PROOF. We build a sequence Z b+1 , . . . , Z 1 of distributions. We set Z b+1 = Z and we define Z to be Z 1 . Suppose we built Z b+1 , . . . , Z i+1 so far, we explain how to build
The idea is to redistribute the weight of every bad prefix w [1,i−1] uniformly over {0, 1} k i . Formally,
• We let Z i have the same distribution on the first i − 1 blocks as
) be the uniform distribution, and for all other prefixes we let (
By definition, at each stage in the process at most β fraction of the prefixes are bad, and so at most bβ of the weight is redistributed. Thus, Z = Z 1 is bβ close to Z.
Also, for any i and any prefix w [1,i] [1,i] ). In the later case, if the prefix w [1,i] is bad this is the uniform distribution, and otherwise it is (Z i+1 |Z [1,i] = w [1,i] ) and has at least k i+1 min-entropy (because the prefix w [1,i] is not bad). In either case,
It follows that Z is bβ close to Z and is an ((n 1 , k 1 
Nisan and Zuckerman (4) showed a simple technique for constructing efficient extractors for block sources. Suppose we are given an ((n 1 , k 1 ), . . . , (n b , k b )) block source, and b strong extractors E 1 , . . . , E b with
The following lemma is implicit in (4) and explicit in (7), though without the mention of strong extractors.
We finally observe that any ((1, k 1 ), . . . , (1, k 1 )) block source with 2
+α is bα close to uniform:
+ α, is bα close to the uniform distribution.
PROOF. We notice that for every prefix the probability of the next bit being 0 or 1 is at most 1 2 +α. We can again induct from i = b to i = 1 and redistribute the weight such that it is perfectly uniform, in much the same way as is done in the proof of Lemma 11. The resulting difference is again at most bα. 2
A reduction to almost block sources
We now present our reduction from general sources to block sources. Let F = F q be a field of size q √ n, q prime. The reduction begins by viewing the n-bit input string x ∈ {0, 1} n as a bivariate polynomial f x : F 2 → F of total degree at most h − 1. We would like different inputs to map into different bivariate polynomials. Every degree h − 1 bivariate polynomial f can be specified using h+1 2
coefficients from F q and so we need
We now present a function Z :
m . We will later show Z reduces high entropy sources to almost block sources. We define:
The function Z Input : x ∈ {0, 1} n . Parameters : α, β > 0 error parameters. m -a parameter specifying output length.
Setting : Set h = 3 n log n , q the first prime with q ≥ Ω( h α 4 β 4 ) and F a field of size q. Binary code : C is a linear binary code of dimension = log q, combinatorial list decoding property
(see Definition 8) and length = poly(α −1 , β −1 ) (see Fact 9) .
. Output : We associate with x ∈ {0, 1} n a function f x : F 2 → F of total degree at most h − 1. We define
For a subset X ⊆ {0, 1} n let U t •Z(X, U t ) denote the random variable obtained by picking x uniformly at random from X, y uniformly at random from F 2 ×[¯ ] and computing y • Z(x; y). We claim: Theorem 14 Let n, α, β > 0 be arbitrary and set h, q and a field F of size q as above. Let m ≤ √ n. For every subset X ⊆ {0, 1} n of cardinality at least q mh the distribution
) and Z can be computed in O(log q) space and poly(q) = poly(n,
(log n − log log n) ≥ n two different inputs give rise to two different bivariate polynomials. Next, note that the number of truly random bits t = log(q 2 ) + log¯ . Using Fact 9,¯ = log q poly(α,β)
, so t = log(q 2 log q) + O(log((αβ) −1 )) = log n + O(log((αβ) −1 )). The running time of Z is dominated by the complexity of evaluating f x (a), which can be done with O(log q) space and poly(q) time. We prove the reduction correctness in §4.
An -almost block extractor.
An extractor working on a general distribution over n input bits requires at least t ≥ log n − O(1) truly random bits, even when the allowed error is a constant (16) . In contrast, the following theorem shows that extractors for block sources require only t = O(1) truly random bits and explicitly construct such an extractor. We prove Theorem 15 in §5.
Putting it together
PROOF. (Of Theorem 2) Suppose m = m(n), k = k(n) and = (n) are such that 3m √ n log( n ) ≤ k ≤ n. Let us set α = β = 2(m+1) and q and h as in Theorem 14. We claim E(x; y) = Z(x; y) is the desired (k, ) strong extractor.
By Fact 6 we can concentrate on high min-entropy flat distributions. Let X be a flat distribution over a subset X ⊆ {0, 1} n of cardinality at least K = 2 k .
Then k ≥ mh log q and so
By Lemma 11 every almost block source is close to a block source, and so U t •Z(X; U t ) is (m+1)β close to a ((t, t), (1, f (α)), . . . , (1, f (α))) block source. Also, by Lemma 13, a block-source with one-bit blocks is close to uniform, and so U t • Z(X; U t ) is (m + 1)(α + β) = close to uniform, as desired. 2
To reduce the O(log m) additive penalty in the number of truly random bits we can use the extractor for almost block sources:
). This determines q to be Θ(
That is, we first apply Z on the input x using the truly random string y 1 , and then we apply the extractor F for β-almost block sources using a fresh truly random string y 2 .
Correctness : Let X be a flat distribution over a subset X ⊆ {0, 1}
n of cardinality at least K = 2 k . As before, |X| ≥ 2 k ≥ q mh . By Theorem 14,
As F is a strong extractor for almost block sources, by Theorem 15, U t • E(X; U t ) is O( ) close to uniform. Parameters : By Theorem 14, the length of y 1 is log n + O(log(
. By Theorem 15 the length of y 2 is O(log −1 ). Thus the number of truly random bits used is as required. The output length of Z is m, and thus the output length of F is at least
m provided that m ≥ Ω(log 2 1 ). . We combine our extractor with a known extractor and block extractor, whose properties we describe.
• The strong block extractor of Reingold, et.al. (14) is a family of functions
with the property that for every δ there exists γ = γ(δ) > 0 such that for all flat distributions over subsets X of cardinality at least |X| ≥ 2 δn , the distribution of U t • B(X; U t ) • X is within
block source. A remarkable property of the construction is that the seed length t is very small, t ≤ O(log log n).
• We also take any explicit strong extractor family with
which is a (2γn, 1 n ) strong extractor with m = γn and t = polylog(n), e.g., the extractor of (4).
We first use the block extractor RSW with O(log log n) truly random bits y 1 to output a block source W 1 • W 2 • W 3 . Say RSW(x; y 1 ) = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ). Our extractor then uses a fresh truly random string y 2 and outputs
where E is the extractor from Theorem 2 (or the more complicated Theorem 3) with polylog(n) output bits and = 1 4 log n error.
To prove correctness we apply Lemma 12 with three extractors E 1 , E 2 and E 3 where E 1 is the identity function E 1 (x, y) = x, E 2 = NZ and E 3 = E the extractor from Theorem 2. The number of truly random bits is the sum of those used for the block extractor RSW and the extractor E 3 = E, which is log n + O(log log n). The total error is the sum of the errors from the block extractor and the two extractors, which is less than 1/ log n. 2
The reduction to almost block sources
To prove Theorem 14, we show that if Z is not as required, then there exists a large subset X of X such that the answers to a small number of queries distinguish elements of X . This shows that X is small, and therefore X itself is small. The reader may want to review the outline given in §1.4. We begin with some definitions.
• a point query of the form, "what is f (v)?" for some point v ∈ F 2 , or, • a line query of the form "which polynomial among p 1 , . . . , p B is equal to f restricted to the line L, denoted f | L ?". If none of the polynomials in p 1 , . . . , p B equals f | L the answer is "quit".
We will be interested in the number of possibilities a query distinguishes among. This is q for the point queries and B for the line queries. The number of possibilities a set of queries distinguishes is the product of the possibilities for each query in the set.
A predictor P for bivariate polynomials is a probabilistic function which on input a ∈ F 2 makes queries Q(a) about a bivariate polynomial f : F 2 → F. The set Q(a) may be chosen at random and may or may not depend on a. On receiving the answers to the queries from an oracle, P computes a subset P (a) ⊆ F. P has preprocessed queries if Q(a) does not depend on a, and P is deterministic if it does not use random coins (neither to choose Q nor to compute its answer).
P has A possible answers if for every a ∈ F 2 , every possible set of queries and every set of answers, the size of P (a) is at most A. P predicts f : F 2 → F with success p if, when the oracle answers the queries according to f ,
n with success p if, for every x ∈ S, P predicts f x with success p.
Suppose P is a predictor for bivariate polynomials and f : F 2 → F is a bivariate polynomial. P f Q (a) denotes the subset P (a) when the queries are Q(a) and the oracle answers according to f . Whenever the set of queries Q is clear from the context we denote it by P f (a). If P is deterministic, the set of queries Q is completely determined by a and we always denote it by P f (a).
Theorem 14 follows from the following proposition:
+α, then there exists a deterministic predictor for a set X of size at least |X | ≥ Notice that while in general we need about
values to determine an arbitrary degree h − 1 bivariate polynomial, here only about mh queries suffice. This immediately implies X is small. We prove Proposition 16 in the next three subsections.
Evaluating a Point
Suppose X is such that U t •Z(X; U t ) is not a β-almost ((t, t), (1, f (α) ), . . . , (1, f (α))) block source and let us fix X. We define a predictor, which depends on the subset X.
The query points are
. . , (a 1 − 1, a 2 )}. Let b i denote the answer to the query (a 1 − i, a 2 ). Algorithm :
• For every j ∈ [¯ ] and b 1 , . . . ,
(Ties are broken arbitrarily.) • Set g(w) = g 1 (w) . . . g¯ (w). Output : EP(w) is the set of all codewords of C that have at least Note that EP is deterministic and that the queries depend on the input a. Also, since C has combinatorial list decoding property
Lemma 17 There exists a subset X ⊂ X of cardinality |X | ≥ PROOF. Recall that the random string y ∈ U t indexes a point a ∈ F 2 and a value j ∈ [¯ ]. Let A z,a,j be a Boolean random variable that is one when
, a, j) < f (α) and zero otherwise. As U t • Z(X; U t ) is not a β-almost ((t, t), (1, f (α) ), . . . , (1, f (α))) block source, by definition, there exists an i 0 ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that Pr a,j,z∈Z (A z,a,j = 1) ≥ β. Now,
An averaging argument shows that there exists a subset X ⊂ X of cardinality at least
Another averaging argument yields for every
For every a such that
it holds that f x (a) ∈ EP(a). It follows for every x ∈ X we have Pr a [f x (a) ∈ EP(a)] ≥ αβ 4 as desired. 2
Evaluating a Line
We use procedure EP to build procedure EL (for "Evaluate-Line") that given a line L makes some specific queries and outputs a single polynomial over F.
EL : Evaluate Line
Input : A line L : F → F 2 not parallel to the x-axis. Algorithm :
• For every i = 1, . . . , q: · Evaluate EP(L(i)) by making the necessary point queries.
• Compute the list G of all univariate polynomials g : F → F of degree at most h − 1 with agreement at least
q with S. We will soon prove that G is always a small set, |G| ≤ O( 1 α 2 β 2 ). Output : Query which one of the polynomials in G is equal to f | L , and output this polynomial. If no polynomial in G equals to f | L output "quit".
We now show that EL does well on random lines.
Lemma 18
For every x ∈ X :
Once G contains the right polynomial, the answer of EL fx (L) is correct by definition. The lemma therefore follows from the following claim, which shows that G almost always contains the right polynomial.
Claim 19 For every
Fix any x ∈ X . Let Y i be the random variable indicating whether L(i) is nice for f x , and
q, i.e., for every x ∈ X we expect to see many nice points on a random line L. We say L is bad for
q. Since L is a random line, the points on L are pairwise independent. Therefore,
If the line L is bad for x (which happens with probability at most O(
and the line L contains at least
We now show that the list decoding process does not return many possible solutions. Since |S| ≤ O( 
We now take a closer look at the point queries done in EL(L). If L is not parallel to the x-axis then EL(L) makes point queries for each point on each of
However, since the values of f x on a line can be determined by querying h points on that line, it suffices to query only h points from each line, and the number of point queries is at most (i 0 − 1)h. Denote this set of point queries Q(L).
Proof of Proposition 16
PROOF. We now give a procedure EA (for "Evaluate-All") that makes few queries and outputs, with good probability, the unique polynomial f x ∈ X that agrees with the queries.
EA : Evaluate All Input : none. Algorithm : Pick a random line L, and query the points in Q(L).
For j = 0 to h − i 0 • Evaluate EL (L + (j, 0) ). Note that all of the point queries needed to evaluate this have been made or deduced previously. Only the line queries need to be made. Output the unique degree h − 1 polynomial consistent with the answers on the h × h block.
To prove Proposition 16, we need a deterministic predictor, so we show that we can fix L suitably. Say that a line L is good for f :
f when picking the line L, is f , and bad otherwise. Recall that η, defined in Lemma 18, is the error probability for EL.
PROOF. For each of the h lines we learn, the probability we fail (given the right answers to the line we use) is at most η. By the union bound (regardless of correlations) the claim follows. 2
and therefore for every
. Hence, there is at least one fixed choice of a line L and a subset X ⊆ X of cardinality at least |X | ≥ 1 2 |X | such that L is good for every x ∈ X . Fix this L. EA L is the required deterministic predictor.
Note that the number of point queries is at most (i 0 − 1)h ≤ (m − 1)h, and the number of line queries is at most h−i 0 +1 ≤ h. Also, the line queries distinguish at most O(1/(α 3 β 3 )) ≤ o(q) possibilities. Thus the predictor distinguishes at most We saw that a β-almost block source with m blocks is mβ close to a block source (Lemma 11). However, it is important for us to avoid this mβ penalty.
The key observation is that at a price of losing at most half the entropy, if we group consecutive blocks, then instead of being β close to the behavior we expect from a block source we are 2β close to it.
and the lemma follows. 2
Thus given, e.g., a β-almost ((1, f (α)), . . . , (1, f (α))) block source with m blocks and some constant α, we can group the m blocks into, say, b metablocks such that each meta-block contains at least half the desired amount of entropy. We can then redistribute the weight of the bad strings in the same way as is done in the proof of Lemma 11(and by Lemma 21 these are at most O(bβ) fraction of all strings) and get a block source with b blocks and the desired entropy. The error term O(bβ) is significantly smaller than mβ if b is small. In the next subsection we follow this outline for a specific choice of parameters that suits our needs.
An Extractor for a block source with very small seed
Lemma 22 Let γ be a positive constant and = (n) > 0. There exists b = b(n) = O(log * n) and n 1 , . . . , n b , n 1 +. . .+n b = n, and a strong -extractor for ((n 1 , γn 1 ) , . . . , (n b , γn b )) block sources, using t = O(log 1 ) random bits, and outputting γn − O(log * n log −1 + log 4 1 ) output bits.
PROOF. We choose the integers n i as follows:
• n b−1 = 1 2 , and,
It can be verified that n i−2 ≥ 2 n i and hence it follows that b = O(log * n). We will need two basic extractors:
• The RRV family of strong extractors ((34),Theorem 4):
which is a (k, ) strong extractor, with t ≤ c 0 log 3 n log −1 and m = k − 2 log −1 − O(1), for some constant c 0 .
• The Zuckerman family of strong extractors (9):
which is a (k = Ω(n), ) strong extractor, with t ≤ O(log n + log −1 ) and m = Ω(k).
We want to apply Lemma 12. For that we choose (k i = γn i , i = 2·2 b−i ) strong extractors
We choose
, and we choose E j to be E RRV n j for j < b. We need to verify that the extractors E i indeed support an output length r i−1 − r i .
Indeed, for E b we have a constant entropy rate and r b = O(log n b + log −1 ), hence we have r b−1 = Ω(n b ) = Ω(log 4 1 ) output bits, which is larger than c 0 log 3 (n b−1 ) log(
) ≈ 8c 0 log 4 1 for the appropriate choice of constant in the choice of n b . For E j , j < b, it is easy to verify that
Having that, Lemma 12 assures us that we get a strong extractor F : {0, 1} m × {0, 1} r b → {0, 1} r 1 −r b with error at most i ≤ . The number of truly random bits is r b = O(log −1 ) as desired. To analyze the number of output bits, we notice that in applying E b we lose at most O(n b ) = O(log 4 1 ) entropy, and applying each E j , j < b, we lose at most 2 log −1 + O(1). Altogether, we lose at most O(b log −1 + log 4 1 ) entropy. 2
Putting it together
We now prove Theorem 15. k 1 ) , . . . , (1, k 1 )) block source. We partition the m blocks into b meta-blocks, the i'th block being of length n i (as in Lemma 22) and
PROOF. (of Theorem 15)
n b )) block source. We now apply the block source extractor of Lemma 22 with γ =
The number of truly random bits used is r b = O(log −1 ). The error is O(bβ) because of the reduction from an almost block source to a block source, plus from Lemma 22. The entropy loss is
n because of the reduction from almost block sources to block sources (by far the most significant loss), plus the entropy loss from Lemma 22. Theorem 15 follows. 2
The Multivariate Extractor
We now describe a generalization of the bivariate extractor to D dimensions, where D ≥ 3. Let h be the smallest integer such that h+D D log(h) ≥ n. Let F = F q be a field of prime size q h. We view the n-bit input string x ∈ {0, 1} n as a function f x : F D → F of total degree at most h. As it takes
log h ≥ n bits to specify a polynomial, different inputs map to different polynomials.
The function ME D Input : x ∈ {0, 1} n .
F is a field of size q where q is the smallest prime larger than Ω(m max(4,D−1) h). We identify x ∈ {0, 1} n with a function f x : H D → F of total degree h. Binary code : C is a linear binary code with dimension = log q, length¯ and combinatorial list decoding property α = 1 8m
. Here e d denotes the basis vector in F D with a 1 in the dth position and 0's elsewhere.
We now give a top-level proof of Theorem 4.
PROOF. (Of Theorem 4)
We first check parameters:
For the correctness proof, we suppose U t • ME(X, U t ) is not close to uniform for some X with |X| ≥ 2 k , and fix X. We first establish that the assumption that is close to 1 ( = 1 −
8D
) implies that there are next-bit predictors in each orthogonal direction except the last.
close to uniform for some X with |X| ≥ 2 k then there are tests T 1 , . . . , T D−1 : {0, 1} m−1 → {0, 1} and a subset X ⊆ X of cardinality at least 
We use the next bit predictors to define procedures EP(a, d) that try to predict f x (a) given its evaluation on the m − 1 preceding points in the d'th dimension. As in the bivariate case, EP(a, d) always returns a small set of possible answers of cardinality at most A ≤ O(
, and we prove that for every
To evaluate everything, we pick a random line and call
for the definition of the + operation on sets see §2). Thus, for d = 0 we have U 0,L = L and we try to learn the values of f x on the one-dimensional line L. For d = 1 we try to learn the values of f x on a two-dimensional affine subspace U 1,L = L + span{e 1 } and so forth, eventually learning f x on the whole space F D , i.e., learning x itself. We conclude that if the extractor fails then the set X has a small description. Hence the set X (and therefore the set X) are small sets, and the random variable X has low min-entropy. The contrapositive of this is Theorem 4. 2
Preliminaries
We record a generalization of Lemma 7.
Lemma 24 Let F be a field of size q, h < q and δ > 0 such that q ≥ 16A 2 h/δ 2 . For each element u ∈ F D assign a set S u ⊆ F of size at most A. Then there are less than 4A/δ D-variate polynomials p of total degree h such that p(u) ∈ S u for at least a δ fraction of points, provided that δ ≥ 2 2hA/|F|.
PROOF. The case D = 1 is a weakening of Lemma 7; the main difference is that Lemma 7 is stated with absolute agreement size whereas this lemma is stated with relative agreement size.
We now prove for general D by reducing to Lemma 7. Suppose there was a set P of 4A/δ such polynomials. Pick a random line L, and consider a polynomial p ∈ P restricted to L. By Chebychev, with probability at least 1 − 2 δq , at least a δ/2 fraction of points u ∈ L satisfy p(u) ∈ S u . By the union bound, the probability there exists a polynomial p ∈ P that does not satisfy the above is at most
, which by our choice of q is smaller than half. Also, for any two different degree h polynomials, their restrictions to a random line are equal with probability at most h q (because a random line in particular contains a random point).
6 The probability that there exists two such polynomials in P is at most
We conclude that there exists a line L that splits P (i.e., the polynomials in P have different restrictions to L) and such that each p ∈ P has a δ/2 fraction of agreement on the line. However, this contradicts Lemma 7. distinguishes U t • ME(X, U t ) from the uniform distribution, i.e.,
and notice that we must have δ d > 0 for every d ∈ [D − 1] (otherwise can not be that close to 1). Then,
and therefore δ d < 1 8 . By a Markov argument, for each d, for at least a 1 − 4δ d fraction of x ∈ X,
Therefore, the fraction of x ∈ X for which (2) holds for all j is at least
. This set is X . Now, for every d ∈ [D − 1] we use Yao's next element predictor argument to convert T into a predictor T d with advantage 1 4m = 2α. By the symmetry of ME , we can assume that the predictor predicts the last bit well. We obtain that for all x ∈ X , Equation (1) holds. 2
Evaluating a point using a given direction
We introduce our point evaluator EP . 
and set g(a) = g 1 (a) · · · g¯ (a). Output : EP(a, d) is the set of all codewords of C that have at least 1 2 + α agreement with g(a).
We note that the best possible predictor T d chooses the majority vote for C(f x (a)) j over all x that are consistent with C(b 1 ) j , . . . , C(b m−1 ) j , as in §4, and so we could have given an alternative definition of g j (a) using that best predictor rather than T d .
The proof of the following lemma is identical to that of the second half of Lemma 17.
Lemma 25 For every
Also, as C has combinatorial list decoding property α, for every x and d we must have
Evaluating All
To evaluate everything, we pick a random line and call Notice that as L itself is a one dimensional affine subspace, U d,L is also an affine subspace. Also, as L is picked at random, with high probability, L does not belong to an affine translation of span{e 1 , . . . , e d−1 }, and so for every d, span{e 1 , . . . , e d−1 , L} will be d-dimensional. Thus, our goal is to learn U D−1,L .
Also, if we define
then it is an affine translation of F d , and so there is an affine translation map
In the bivariate case, this corresponds to viewing the line as a one dimensional (affine) subspace over F.
We are now ready to present the reconstruction algorithm:
Input : A line L and a dimension d. The queries are answered by f . Algorithm : If span{e 1 , . . . , e d−1 , L} is not d-dimensional we fail and output "don't know". Otherwise:
Query U on h points, interpolate the unique polynomial p of degree less than h, and deduce f (x) for all x ∈ L. For d = 1, . . . , D − 1 :
After this we deduce a (hopefully correct) value f (y) for each i = 0, . . . , m − 2 and y ∈ L + ie d + span{e 1 , . . . , e d−1 }.
Note that the queries needed for EP(u, d) have been made or previously deduced. · Define an affine map φ i : If there is a single polynomial g ∈ G such that g(a i ) = b i for i ∈ [ ], then deduce that for all v, f (φ i (v)) = g(v). Otherwise output "don't know".
Lemma 26 Pr
).
PROOF.
The probability that span{e 1 , . . . , e D−1 , L} is not D-dimensional is at most Let us define error d to be the probability (over choosing a random line L) that Eval(d, L) = f x (U d,L ), given that all queries are answered correctly. Clearly, error 0 = 0. Also, we will soon prove the recursion: Fix any x ∈ X . Points in U i are indexed by s ∈ F and a ∈ span{e 1 , . . . , e d−1 }, the point corresponding to s, a being U i (s, a) = L(s) + ie d + a. For an index v = (s, a), let Y v be the indicator random variable that is 1 iff U i (v) is nice for f x , and Y = v Y v . We have E(Y ) ≥ α|U i | = αq d , i.e., for every x ∈ X we expect to see many nice points in U i . We say U i is bad for x if Y ≤ E(Y )/2.
Every point in U i is uniform over all possible values (over a random choice of L). We would like to claim that the points in U i are pairwise independent. If we look at two points, one indexed by v 1 = (s 1 , a 1 ), the other by v 2 = (s 2 , a 2 ), and s 1 = s 2 , then clearly the two points are independent (over a random choice of L). On the other hand they may be dependent for s 1 = s 2 . Let us denote v 1 ∼ v 2 iff s 1 = s 2 . We have:
Hence, We check and see that . Now, a 1 , . . . , a ∆ ∈ F d are taken uniformly from F d . The probability two different polynomials of degree at most h agree on ∆ random points is at most ( h q ) ∆ . Therefore, the probability there are two or more solutions that agree with the query on f x (L(a i )) for all i ∈ [∆] is at most
This accounts to a third error term of order O( h q d ) which is swallowed by the second error term.
Otherwise, for every i = m − 1, . . . , h − 1, U i has enough nice points, we therefore have the correct answer in G, and the filtering leaves us with a single answer that must be the correct answer. Thus, we learn U d,L correctly. Since we take D to be a constant, this is merely Θ(log(n)). We thus see that the total number of queries, queries D−1 , is bounded by m D−2 (m + ∆)h ≤ O(m D−1 h log(n)) (with the log(n) term disappearing if m ≥ log(n)), and each query is log(q) bits. In bits, this amounts to querying at most O(m D−1 n 1/D log 2 (n) bits.
We remark that there is nothing special about our choice of e 1 , . . . , e D−1 . Any set of D − 1 independent vectors will do for the construction.
